Modestly he does not tell the reader which of the protagonists are his own clients but even when he lacks inside knowledge and has to rely on published sources I can confirm from those cases in which I myself have been involved that his accounts are, with one exception, extremely well researched and balanced. The exception, when his usual even-handedness fails him is the case brought by John Major against the New Statesman. As Major’s solicitor he puts a slant on it which seeks to validate a rather shabby and undignified attack on a politically opposed paper which put its future in serious jeopardy. I declare my own partisanship because I acted for the New Statesman. I do not agree that the article was libellous though the trailer for it on the cover of the paper may have misled some readers. Major and the lady in question recovered handsome damages from the distributors who naturally wanted to settle. They had nothing to lose because, under their agreement with the paper, they could collect from it whatever they had to pay out. I would be surprised if the ingenious Mr. Hooper had not foreseen this.

It may seem churlish to criticise a light-hearted and extremely well and wittily written book for not being serious but libel can be a serious matter and its victims do not on the whole include the well-resourced media organisations. Likewise the millionaires who can afford to sue them attract little sympathy whether they win or lose. The gladiatorial contests of loquacious barristers and their egocentric clients obscure the real devastation which false and irresponsible media attacks can cause to those who cannot afford to challenge them. Nor should we ignore the harm to press freedom which oppressive libel actions can inflict on struggling small-circulation magazines like the New Statesman, or, more recently, Living Marxism (LM).

Libel law has to balance conflicting values. Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention protects freedom of expression as a fundamental right and the domestic courts are steadily increasing the freedom of press and broadcasters to publish inaccurate and damaging statements with impunity, at least where they can demonstrate that they have done everything reasonably possible to check the story. Thus the defence of fair comment was extended by the House of Lords in the recent case of Albert Reynolds.

It remains arguable that the law favours the complainant unfairly, mainly because, unlike the law in most other countries, it places the burden on the publisher to prove the truth of a defamatory statement. After 2 October, when the Human Rights Act comes into effect, this and other limitations on freedom of expression may face new challenges in the courts. However, Article 10 contains the standard qualification permitting laws which restrict freedom of expression where the restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society” for protecting the rights and freedoms of others. This is where the balance comes in. Protecting reputation from false and damaging slurs is plainly a necessary function of the law and the courts. It is debatable where precisely the balance should be struck butit is hardly unreasonable to impose some responsibility on the media to take care before publishing a damaging story to check its accuracy, or, if there is a strong public interest in the subject matter and it cannot be completely verified, doing everything practically possible to do so.

The injustices which libel law causes or fails to put right result mainly from the way the decision-making process has been distorted by legalism and the influence of money. Libel claims are rarely possible except between millionaires, whether individuals or corporations on both sides or, ironically, between millionaires and penniless litigants in person, like the “McLibel Two”, sued ineffectually by McDonalds in the longest running libel action in our history.

Why is it so expensive? Lawyers who do libel work for the rich, like lawyers who do any other work for the rich and the rich themselves, are seriously overpaid. Their hourly rates can be five or six times those of legal aid solicitors. But it is the number of hours worked or claimed which really matters. Large media organisations almost without exception will try to settle a case quickly if it is indefensible, but if there is an arguable defence there seems no limit to the resources they will deploy to rescue the pride of the erring journalist and signal the toughness and determination not to submit which is thought necessary to deter fortune hunters. Hitherto lawyers have given in to the almost irresistible temptation to inflate and proliferate issues and arguments, aided by the word-processor and the photo-copier. Judges are traditionally referees, unwilling to step into the arena to stop time-wasting examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

Those who lose out are the poor victims who cannot afford to sue or those who are sued and cannot afford to defend themselves - and they are usually the ones most seriously damaged. Legal aid has never been available in libel cases. I have recently acted for a journalist whose career was completely destroyed by a blatantly false story in a Sunday newspaper. Exceptionally, means were found in his case to enable him to sue successfully. The harm goes far beyond the individual cases by encouraging the strong to lie with impunity and deterring the weak (including much of the small-circulation press) from telling the public what it deserves to know.

In his book David Hooper points out, that there is now scope for impoverished victims to sue if they can persuade lawyers to take the case on a “no win, no fee” basis, but reduced levels of damages and the complexity and cost of fighting libel actions make that option unattractive for lawyers in most cases. An abbreviated procedure which will enable a judge to give a summary decision in supposedly straight forward cases where the damages claim is limited to £10,000 will help some poorer claimants, but the large media organisations will try hard – as has already been demonstrated in the first cases using this procedure – to by-pass it.

Earlier this year, Article 19 held an international seminar of human rights and defamation specialists to draft universal principles for libel laws. The consensus broadly supported a system of redress through the civil courts such as ours but limited to cases in which the genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect the reputation of individuals against unjustifiable harm. It stressed that truth should always be a defence but in matters of public concern the claimant should bear the burden of proving the falsity of any defamatory statements. Even where a false statement is published, there should be defence of “reasonable publication” on the lines of the Reynolds judgement. The remedy should be aimed at putting right the harm done, and damages should be awarded only where other remedies, such as a prompt correction, were insufficient. Procedures should be speedy and costs should not be a deterrent.

Our system stands up reasonably well by these criteria. The last point is the main weakness. If procedures are truly simplified, as the new rules drafted by Lord Woolf are already designed to achieve, the entertaining and hugely expensive battles described in David Hooper’s book will – sadly for those who practise and write about the law – be a thing of the past.